Paul Martial October, 2024
The latest report from the NGO Doctors Without Borders (MSF) reports a very sharp increase in sexual violence in Kivu, the eastern region of the DRC. More than 25,000 women have been treated, not counting those who prefer to remain silent. A figure that speaks volumes about the ordeal suffered by the population. The violence is the fault of both the various militias that are proliferating and the state actors in the region. As for the Western powers, while France is at the origin of this ongoing war, the others remain in a wait-and-see attitude bordering on complicity in guaranteeing a supply of minerals essential to high-tech industries.
In 1994, it was a declining dictator, Mobuto of Zaire, who gave in to pressure from French representatives to make the Kivu region the rear base for the Turquoise military operation in Rwanda, presenting this as a humanitarian action.
From the Rwandan genocide to the Congo war
Mobutu, who had been in power for nearly thirty years in Zaire, what would later become the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), certainly did not know that his agreement would mark not only the end of his reign, but the beginning of three decades of conflict. A war that unfortunately continues to this day, becoming one of the longest and deadliest in modern African history.
Although supported by France, the Rwandan genocidal forces failed to contain the offensive of the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) led by Paul Kagame and composed mainly of Tutsi exiles but also of Hutu opponents. The RPF, by conquering the capital, Kigali, put an end to the genocide, causing the rout of the Rwandan regime. The latter led the mainly Hutu population in its flight, notably towards Zaire, supervised by the French Operation Turquoise.
This military operation allowed the exfiltration of the main leaders and many actors of the genocide. From the refugee camps, they then tried to regain power by force with the weapons kept during their exile but also by deliveries that took place in the DRC without the French authorities opposing it.
While Rwanda was devastated, the new authorities also considered the refugee camps in the DRC as a serious threat. It was from these camps that the mainly Hutu genocidaires recruited fighters to launch their attacks against the Rwanda with the specious objective of regaining power. They settled permanently in the eastern region of the Congo and created a militia, the Democratic Front for the Liberation of Rwanda (FDLR). Paul Kagame led armed operations against the camps without distinguishing between civilians and genocidaires, and, with the help of Uganda, he brought about the fall of the Mobutu regime, considered to be far too conciliatory with members of the former Rwandan regime.
Rwandan and Ugandan interventionism
Rwanda and Uganda participated in the creation of a guerrilla group, the Alliance of Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Congo (AFDL), led by Laurent Désiré Kabila, who seized power after a few months. This military event is considered to be the first Congo War.
Once appointed president, Laurent Désiré Kabila wanted his former Rwandan and Ugandan allies to leave. But hoping to influence the new government to their advantage, they stayed. Their goal was to transform the Congo into a kind of dominion that would allow both the securing of their respective borders and the exploitation of the country’s wealth. This desire to dominate the DRC was the main reason for the second Congo War, in which other countries were involved and which saw the proliferation of militias.
A peace agreement was concluded, leading to elections in July 2006 won by Joseph Kabila, Laurent Désiré’s son. However, the underlying problems persist and fuel the successive conflicts that the country is experiencing.
Rwandan politics
The emergence of the FDLR was an additional element of the crisis. This militia attacked the population and more particularly the Tutsi community. A community composed of the Banyamulenge, a population present in the Congo since the 19th century, as well as Tutsis from Rwanda, from a more recent immigration initiated by Belgian colonists. This community is regularly the victim of ostracism fuelled by politicians accusing it of supporting Rwanda and questioning the “Congoleseness” of its members. In this context, the National Congress for the Defense of the People (CNDP) was created, a militia that intended to protect the Tutsis of the DRC and supported by Rwanda.
In parallel with this policy, the exploitation of Congolese wealth has become increasingly important for Rwanda over time. As early as 1999, Rwandan and Ugandan troops allied with the AFDL clashed for control of the gold mines in the Kisangani region, leading to the Mweya Agreement. It was this competition between Uganda and Rwanda for the exploitation of the wealth that would gradually determine Rwandan policy in the DRC.
The CNDP and the Congolese government signed a peace agreement on March 23, 2009. This gave its name, M23, to the next militia that was created three years later to contest the application of the agreement. The M23 grew in size and managed to seize the large regional capital Goma. Concerned about the potential destabilization of the country, the West then put pressure on the Rwandan authorities by suspending $200 million in aid so that they would stop supporting the M23. At the same time, an offensive battalion of the United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUSCO) was created, made up of 3,000 soldiers from South Africa, Malawi and Tanzania, who succeeded in defeating the M23 militia in 2013.
Kagame’s counter-offensive
While the M23 was no longer in the news after its defeat, it reappeared in November 2021. Initially, there were no particular elements to report. The FDLR has long since ceased to pose a threat to Rwanda, and there have been no attacks on the Banyamulenge community. The only notable fact was the signing of an agreement six months earlier to build road infrastructure with Uganda on two axes: Kasindi-Beni-Butembo and Bunagana-Goma, the latter road passing a few kilometers from the Rwandan border. This investment reflects the Congolese authorities’ desire to develop an economic partnership with Uganda, which would lead to the marginalization of Rwanda. The M23 therefore becomes an element of pressure on Kinshasa. It carries out military operations to conquer territories, massively supported by Kigali (the capital of Rwanda), which provides it with men and heavy and sophisticated weaponry. It occupies a large part of the territories of Rutshuru, Masisi and Nyiragongo. The M23 is also trying to play a political score that challenges the power of Tshisekedi, president of the Democratic Republic of Congo since 2019, with the integration as a political wing of the Congo River Alliance (AFC) of Corneille Nangaa, former president of the Independent National Electoral Commission (CENI) and architect of Tshisekedi’s rigged election in 2019. This Congo River Alliance is trying to unite all oppositions to the government and present itself as a political alternative.
In a way, Kagame has two irons in the fire; if he has to make concessions at the military level, he will still be able to maintain influence over the country’s internal political life. Even if it is in a hushed manner, Kagame also evokes the questioning of the colonial border by referring to the conquests of the Rwandan King Rwabugiri in the 19th century who is said to have conquered the current territories of Rutshuru, Masisi and Walikale. An interpretation refuted by most historians who only mention a few captures of chiefdoms attached to Rwanda such as those of Jomba and Bwisha.
The impotence of the Congolese government
Félix Tshisekedi (DRC President since 2019) cherished the hope of repeating what had happened with the CNDP (for runner of M23), financial pressure from the West against Rwanda and a large-scale military offensive by MONUSCO. This option is no longer possible.
Rwanda has become a fulcrum for the African policies of the USA and Europe, through its effective participation in UN peacekeeping missions, its role in securing the installation of oil majors such as TotalEnergies in Mozambique and its acceptance of migrants turned back from Britain – even if this project was abandoned by the new British government. Cornered by the evidence of UN experts, the West was content to accompany its condemnation of Rwanda with a few sanctions for Rwandan officers directly involved in the intervention in the DRC. However, Western countries have the means to put an end to this policy of aggression against Rwanda. In 2021, the country received $1.25 billion in aid, the equivalent of two-thirds of its budget.
The Congolese authorities then called on the East African Community (EAC). The East African Community Regional Force (EACRF) landed in the country in November 2022. It is composed mainly of troops from Kenya, which hopes for an economic return on its military investment. However, Kenya was not ready for a military confrontation with Rwanda and tried to deploy diplomatic efforts. In vain. It was sent back after a year due to its inaction and the authorities turned to southern African countries. Thus, in mid-December 2023, a military mission was set up composed of soldiers from Tanzania, Malawi and South Africa. The South African National Defence Force was the main force with a deployment of 2,900 soldiers, without the results on the ground being very convincing.
At the national level, Tshisekedi declared a state of emergency in the Kivu regions. This implied the full power of the military, not necessarily able to manage regions, and above all it led to total impunity for their arbitrary, even violent, policy against the populations. This measure also allowed officers to enrich themselves by taking control of customs, tax, and municipal and regional service purchasing services. A summary report of the hearings on the assessment of the state of siege established in 2021 indicates that of the sum of 37 million dollars released for these regions, 53% ended up in the pockets of senior officers in Kinshasa.
The Congolese authorities are perfectly aware of the deplorable state of the Armed Forces of the DRC (FARDC). It is composed of a variety of layers including armed militias. According to the peace agreements, they were integrated into the army, their leaders having officer status. Most have had no military training and continue to operate as militias with parallel lines of command.
Added to this is corruption. Part of the salaries are embezzled by the officers, as is the money for equipment and energy. The soldiers do not hesitate to sell their ammunition and sometimes their weapons to local militias. The rest of the salaries are so derisory that few soldiers are motivated to fight. In addition, most of the officers’ emoluments come from operational bonuses, often given on a discretionary basis. This system encourages a clientelist relationship between subordinates and superiors as well as the perpetuation of conflicts. The Tshisekedi government, instead of trying to resolve these endemic problems, prefers to organize trials against soldiers who flee the fighting, with the key being death sentences, without there being any concrete results on the ground.
Other problematic measures include the call for civilians under the “homeland defense volunteers” program and cooperation with the various militias that scour the region. These groups have found a fresh start – despite their many crimes – by calling themselves Wazalendo (“patriots” in Kiswahili). The government provides them with weapons and turns a blind eye to human rights violations. While their effectiveness varies depending on the militia, it is also real, due to their knowledge of the terrain and the motivation to defend their land, and this policy reinforces the community fragmentation of the country. The consequences are serious because communities are often in competition with each other for access to land and/or mineral wealth.
Finally, we have noted for some time the presence of mercenary companies, such as Agemira, registered in Bulgaria and headed by a former French gendarme and the Romanian company Asociatia RALF.
War economy
The situation in the DRC depends heavily on the foreign policy of neighbouring countries. Thus, the conflicting relations between Rwanda and Uganda have direct effects on the security conditions in the country. Thus, the UN experts, while showing Rwanda’s strong and active support for the M23, also highlighted Uganda’s assistance to this militia, a direct consequence of the warming of diplomatic relations between the two countries.
One of the fundamental issues is the absence of the State and the large-scale corruption exercised by all persons holding power, however minimal. The State is absent in rural areas, and decaying and predatory in cities. Politicians, for the most part, activate community ostracisms in order to build popularity allowing them to access political responsibilities that open the way to sources of enrichment. The cost of the Congolese Parliament between 2021 and 2023 amounts to $1.1 billion, a third of which is irregular expenditure.
The mines are becoming the subject of endless conflicts between different militias. The latest example, the Cooperative for the Development of Congo (CODECO) clashed with the “Zaire Group” for control of the Bianda mining site in the Djugu territory, resulting in the death of five people. The Zaire Group, in retaliation, attacked the village of Gbata, leading to further attacks by CODECO, which seized the Mambeu mining site, with 21 deaths. This type of violent confrontation takes place throughout the territories of eastern DRC.
This is how a real war economy is developing based on the so-called three T mining operations: cassiterite to produce tin, wolframite for tungsten and coltan for tantalum. The extraction of these minerals is done in undignified conditions where populations, including children, are forced to work under the threat of armed militias and sometimes even the FARDC (DRC army). The traceability system certifying that these minerals are not produced by child labour and do not finance the militias is, in everyone’s opinion, totally deficient and has often worked against the interests of the populations.
This exploitation contributes to the enrichment of Rwanda’s elites who export it to the main high-tech industries benefiting from the support of the European Union (EU) which declares “the country is a major player at the global level in the tantalum extraction sector. It also produces tin, tungsten, gold and niobium, and has reserves of lithium and rare earths.” And the EU adds that this protocol “will contribute to ensuring a sustainable supply of raw materials”, in particular critical raw materials, “which is an essential prerequisite for achieving green and clean energy objectives”. The only problem is that Rwanda does not produce any of these minerals, and those it supplies come from the pillage of the DRC.
When the militias do not control mines, they live off the racketeering of populations by setting up checkpoints at the various crossing points. Another very lucrative activity, particularly in the Virunga National Park, is the charcoal trade, which can bring in nearly $60,000 per day for the various armed groups but destroys a site characterized by exceptional biodiversity. Other sources of funding are mobilized such as poaching for the sale of ivory and the sale of bushmeat (from wild animals) or illegal fishing activities.
Diplomacy at an impasse
In this war with multiple actors, impunity reigns and only encourages violence against civilians. Especially since the weapons of both sides are becoming heavier with the use of artillery but also aviation and drones. This is why the M23 does not hesitate to bomb refugee camps.
There are more than seven million people displaced by the violence. The populations have no choice but to leave their villages to join the overcrowded refugee camps around the big cities, considered safer.
To try to resolve this situation, a diplomatic policy has been put in place around two peace initiatives, that of Nairobi and Angola. The first is dedicated to meetings between armed militias and the Congolese government, the second focuses on regional solutions. The DRC authorities refuse to allow the M23 to be present in the Nairobi discussions, arguing that it is not a Congolese militia but an offshoot of the Rwandan army. That being said, the ties between the two countries are not completely broken, meetings between senior dignitaries of the two regimes continue under the leadership of João Lourenço, the Angolan president. The latter announced, on the sidelines of the 79th session of the UN General Assembly in September 2024, a proposal for a peace agreement between the two countries that would be structured around two axes, the withdrawal of Rwandan troops and the neutralization of the FDLR. One point remains unresolved, the demand of the Congo River Alliance for direct negotiations with the Congolese government, which categorically refuses to do so. Recently, the FARDC began to attack the FDLR, a way for the Congolese authorities to show their willingness to find a diplomatic solution to the conflict.
A repressive government
The reestablishment of the death penalty in the DRC, used against deserters but also against the leaders of the Congo River Alliance, is part of a voluntary policy of restrictions on public life. Proof of this is the increase in attacks on the right to assembly and demonstration, the limits on freedom of expression and the press or on social networks with the adoption of the new digital code, as well as the harassment and kidnapping of activists from the NGO LUCHA, and even the assassinations of political opponents such as Chérubin Okende, spokesperson for Moïse Katumbi’s Ensemble pour la République party. At the end of August 2023, the presidential guard shot at point-blank range members of a mystical-religious group, “Natural Jewish and Messianic Faith Towards the Nations” who were peacefully demonstrating against the presence of MONUSCO, killing at least 57 people.
To suppress opposition, the authorities have at their disposal structures such as the National Intelligence Agency (ANR), the Military Detection of Anti-Patriotic Activities (DEMIAP) or the National Security Council, each of which has secret prisons where torture is frequent.
President Tshisekedi has in no way broken with the governance of previous powers, whether on electoral fraud, corruption or ethnic division policies. Certainly, Rwandan President Paul Kagame has a heavy responsibility in the deterioration of the social fabric. The first victims are the members of the Tutsi community of the DRC, whether they are Banyamulenge or from colonial-era immigration. But this deterioration in the ability to live together is accentuated by the policy of the Congolese authorities who favour the Wazalendo, offering them impunity for their past crimes and thus undermines the future of the country by encouraging these armed militias, a real terror for the populations.
