Friday, June 13, Paul Martial, a French Marxist
Barely having arrived in Mali, mercenaries from the new Russian military structure Africa Corps, replacing Wagner, the militia of the deceased Yevgeny Prigozhin, were ambushed between Anefis and Aguelhoc in the Kidal region. The toll was heavy. Several dozen deaths are reported [1]. The operation was claimed by the Azawad Liberation Front (FLA), which mainly comprises Tuareg separatists.
This trap undermines the narrative presenting Russian mercenaries, whether from Wagner or Africa Corps, and often belonging successively to both entities, as formidable soldiers who were supposed to make a difference in the military arena. It also puts into perspective the only success Wagner can claim, namely the recovery of Kidal, a stronghold of the Tuareg independence movements, presented by the Malian authorities as the reconquest of national sovereignty, which has proven to be precarious, to say the least.
The replacement of Wagner by Africa Corps will not fundamentally change the relationship between the Malian authorities and Russian proxies. Most of Wagner’s fighters have been integrated into Africa Corps. What could evolve is a greater control by the Russian authorities over Malian politics, as the new entity is subordinate to the Ministry of Defense, which was not the case for Wagner. Other changes could occur, particularly on the economic front. The Malian government paid $10 million monthly to the mercenary agency [2]. With Africa Corps, we are seeing a formalization of the Russian intervention, considered more as a state-to-state relationship, potentially opening the way for the Malian government to be exempted from this payment. Essentially, nothing is expected to change, including on the military front, both in Mali and in the two other countries, Niger and Burkina Faso, which form the Alliance of Sahel States (ESA), which are also facing jihadist attacks.
The Deteriorating Humanitarian Situation
Since the military juntas of the ESA countries seized power, the jihadists of the JNIM, the acronym for Jamāʿat nuṣrat al-islām wal-muslimīn (Group for the Support of Islam and Muslims), affiliated with Al-Qaeda, and the troops of the Islamic State in the Greater Sahara (ISGS), have continued to advance. Of the 135 administrative entities in these three Sahelian countries, most experts consider that two-thirds are under the more or less loose control of Islamist groups. This progression is accompanied by a significant increase in deaths, with nearly 11,200 recorded by the end of June 2024. This represents a threefold increase compared to 2021. This trend must be viewed with caution, as the juntas’ control over information, along with a crackdown on journalists, suggests that this trend remains underestimated.
On the humanitarian front, the situation has also worsened, with nearly five and a half million people displaced. In most areas where war rages between Islamist and armed forces, schools and health centers are closed, leaving populations without education and healthcare. For example, in Burkina Faso, 20% of health facilities and approximately 5,300 educational structures are abandoned. As a result, 40% of children do not have access to school.
Food insecurity is considered a major risk. In Mali, 12% of the population is malnourished, in Niger, half of the children suffer from moderate or severe nutritional deficiencies, and in Burkina Faso, more than 2.3 million people suffer from hunger.
The Jihadist Advance
Islamist groups are gaining ground by taking advantage of the weakening of national armies due to the negligence and corruption of most senior officers. They embezzle salaries and use part of the substantial funding that countries allocate to their defense to build villas or buy companies. Added to this is the trafficking of arms, sometimes sold to armed groups.
Experts at Conflict Armament Research estimate that most of the attackers’ weapons and ammunition come from national armies, much of which is recovered following attacks on military convoys or barracks. [3]
In addition, the jihadists have invested heavily in technology, particularly in communications, thanks to Starlink networks that allow information to circulate between fighters, giving them a decisive advantage during battles. This strengthening of operational capabilities is accompanied, with Musk’s satellite network, by a presence on major social networks where short videos highlight the successes of their military operations, contradicting official communications from the authorities. [4]
Furthermore, the advantage that the armed forces of the Sahelian countries had in the air tends to fade with the use of drones by armed groups. They use them for intelligence gathering, for bombing but also for conducting battles. The first use of drones took place in Mali in April 2024 where the fighters used a quadcopter, equipped with grenades and mortar shells to attack a Dozo militia allied with the national army. In Burkina Faso, the attack on the Diapaga military camp, which caused the death of around fifty people and led to the capture of a large arsenal, including armoured cars, was led with the help of drones. This allowed the insurgent leaders to have a global vision of the battlefield. It is likely that the use of drones by armed groups will intensify, increasing their strike force.
In this context, national armies are unable to hold their territories; barracks become targets, and each attack increases the number of soldiers killed or captured, causing demoralization among the troops. The example of the Boulikessi camp, considered highly strategic for its control of the roads in central Mali, is quite revealing. Attacked twice in one month, the Malian army had no other option but to abandon this position under the euphemism of a strategic withdrawal.
The ruling juntas
Both socially and security-wise, the situation is extremely worrying and continues to deteriorate. Yet, it was to end the security deficit that the military in the three countries decided to overthrow the civilian regime, as if the army bore no responsibility for this state of affairs. The military’s seizure of power took place in a context of strong popular militancy, albeit differentiated in the three countries. In Mali, significant mobilizations, notably led by the June 5 Movement – Rally of Patriotic Forces (M5-RFP), took place against the government of President Ibrahim Boubacar Keïta, who not only suffered a series of economic and military failures but was also tarnished by various corruption scandals. The “bling bling” escapades of the president’s son, Karim, were particularly targeted. On social media, he was seen taking selfies cruising on a luxury yacht, where champagne flowed freely, dancing with young girls.
The military hijacked the popular mobilization by usurping power with the complicity of a minority of the M5-RFP led by Choguel Maïga, who would become prime minister without any real power.
In Burkina Faso, in 2014, a revolution overthrew the dictatorship of Blaise Compaoré, leading to elections in which the two main candidates were liberals close to France. The record of Roch Marc Christian Kaboré’s government, like their Malian civilian co-religionist, has been unable to redress the situation in the slightest. The attack on the Inata gendarmerie barracks sparked public outrage because, despite several appeals, these gendarmes remained isolated, reduced to hunting for food. During the attack led by the jihadists, around sixty soldiers were killed.
While responsibility for this event was largely shared between the Kaboré government and the army, this in no way prevented the military from seizing power through a first coup d’état led by Lieutenant Colonel Paul-Henri Sandaogo Damiba, followed by a second. The Burkinabé army had a completely free hand, unlike in Mali, with the absence of any political opposition. The desire of the Citizens’ Broom movement, well established among young people, to confine itself solely to a watchdog role on the political scene, to remove the possibility of appearing as an alternative to politicians whose allegiance to France was obvious.
Another path could have been taken, like the Resistance Committees in Sudan. They appeared initially as a civilian movement of aid and solidarity, then as a mobilization tool, and finally, just before the war of the generals, were able to propose a “revolutionary charter of popular power” presented as an alternative to the military but also to the political parties integrated into the system.
Niger presents a notable difference. President Mohamed Bazoum was elected in a generally satisfactory electoral process. He had begun to follow an interesting path in an attempt to end the war waged by the jihadists by attempting both a military response and a policy of openness for peace talks. However, he emerged as the man of the French by agreeing to host French troops in his countries that had previously been expelled from Mali and then Burkina Faso. Furthermore, before running for president, Bazoum was Minister of the Interior and Security, leaving a strong negative impression on the country’s activists. [5] An incident that has gone relatively unnoticed but reflects the tensions and mobilizations against French imperialism is the demonstration in Téra, in the Tillabéri region, against the Operation Barkhane convoy, the repression of which left two dead, likely caused by gunfire from French soldiers.
It is clear, more or less, that the rise to power of the military in the AES countries remains a consequence of popular mobilizations against corrupt civilian governments. It has also been fueled by the population’s incomprehension about the tangible lack of results against jihadists by the French army, which prides itself on knowing the terrain and is incapable of stemming enemy attacks. For many young people, this incomprehension turned into doubt, then into the conviction of France’s complicity with armed groups. This opinion was popular on social media. It also owes its success to the French army’s policy of forging a genuine, albeit informal, alliance with Tuareg separatists, grouped at the time in the National Movement for the Liberation of Azawad (MNLA). The joint work between the MNLA and the French army against the jihadists was seen as an attack on national sovereignty because it implied the sanctuary of the Kidal region for the pro-independence Tuaregs.
On the economic level, the Malian junta engaged in a standoff with Western mining companies for a fairer sharing of profits. While this objective led to coercive measures against the managers of multinational subsidiaries, it did not in itself constitute a break with the economic order. Many African governments have reviewed their mining laws and amended them in order to achieve a better distribution of wealth. In the past, governments that were completely reactionary and completely aligned with Western governments have sometimes taken much more radical measures. This is the case, for example, with the Zaireanization policy in Congo, which included an economic aspect launched by Mobutu. This led to the change of currency, the nationalization of land and commercial property belonging to foreigners. This campaign was carried out with a clear desire to break with anything that could represent the West in the country. Thus, first names, town names, and street names were changed, including that of the country. The Congo would become the Republic of Zaire.
This violent, bureaucratic, and top-down policy was a way to strengthen a clientelist policy for the sustainability of power. This is what is happening with the AES juntas, which are profiting greatly from the security rents generated by the explosion of defense budgets [6]. The methods of corruption remain classic: opaque contracts without calls for tender, the awarding of public contracts to family members or those close to the junta, and the repression of journalists and NGOs to prevent information about these embezzlements from circulating. However, it is difficult to hide the luxurious villas recently built by junta members. [7]
Regarding the sovereigntist narratives widely used by the putschists, they are hardly convincing. It should be remembered that the leaders of Françafrique also do not hesitate to use anti-colonialist vocabulary or “pan-African” organizations to vilify NGOs that highlight the corruption of these satraps. Thus, the “NGO” Dignity and African Conscience organized a press conference to “address the attacks by Western NGOs against African leaders,” with the question, “How can we accept that heads of state of independent countries should be subjected to such intrusions into the internal affairs of their respective countries?” [8]
Malian leaders understood that the issue of the reconquest of Kidal could strengthen their popularity and give some credence to their sovereigntist declarations, even if in the medium term this policy proved catastrophic, as we will see a little later. Certainly, statements opposing French policy are always enthusiastically received, whether it be that of Prime Minister Choguel Maïga at the United Nations, declaring that France had abandoned Mali in mid-flight, or that of Burkinabé leader Ibrahim Traoré, criticizing the West’s neo-colonialist policies, under the benevolent eye of his host, Putin, thus reenacting a pale, adulterated copy of Thomas Sankara. Especially since the behavior of the French authorities only fuels this rhetoric.
With Barkhane, the French military hierarchy directed operations and ignored the opinions of the Sahelian countries concerned. French soldiers worked in collaboration with militias guilty of war crimes, such as GATIA, the Tuareg Self-Defense Group Imghad and allies [9]. The French forces were responsible for bombing civilians, particularly in Bounti, killing 19 people, while systematically refusing to establish an independent commission of inquiry. The French authorities wanted to intervene militarily to restore Bazoum following the coup. Not to mention, of course, the continued arrogance of President Macron, which irks both Africans and the French.
Juntas versus the population
The central question for the three juntas could be summed up as how to remain in power with a record far removed from the promises made to justify their coup. For many months, talk of sovereignty and a second independence for the AES countries met with approval. This support is now beginning to crumble in light of the almost daily attacks by armed groups, resulting in deaths, prisoners, and accounts of soldiers under attack receiving no aid despite their desperate pleas. Villages are surrounded and abandoned to their sad fate by the authorities. The policies adopted by juntas remain primarily to limit information in favour of propaganda based, as Trump would say, on alternative truths. Thus, independent radio and television stations are being shut down, newspapers are being threatened, and journalists are being gagged.
Dissenting voices must also be stifled; even early supporters of coups who are critical are being imprisoned in Mali or sent to the front lines in Burkina Faso. In Niger, anti-imperialist activists like Moussa Tchangari are being imprisoned on the orders of President Abdourahamane Tiani, former head of the presidential guard. He now sees himself as the herald of the country’s sovereignty, yet during his long career he has not particularly distinguished himself in the fight against French neocolonialism. In Burkina Faso, trade unionists like Moussa Diallo, Secretary General of the CGT-B, are forced to go underground. In Mali, political parties are now banned, and activists like Oumar Mariko, leader of the radical left party African Solidarity for Democracy and Independence (SADI), are forced into exile. At the same time, ad hoc structures created and subordinated to the juntas are endorsing presidents. Asimi Goita, who rose directly from colonel to five-star general, will be able to remain president of Mali as long as the country faces terrorist risks.
Their management of the war has truly worsened the situation. In Mali, the junta unilaterally denounced the Algiers Accords signed by a series of armed groups, most of them pro-independence. Then it considered them terrorists and launched the operation to recapture Kidal. Not only did the Malian junta alienate Algeria, the main regional force accusing it of destabilizing Mali, but it also opened a new internal front with the risk, which is tending to materialize, of an alliance between JNIM and FLA. In Burkina Faso, the headlong rush is in place with the establishment of the Volunteers for the Defense of the Homeland (VDP). These recruited civilians receive one or two weeks of very basic military training. They are supposed to be an intelligence aid for the army. Scattered throughout the villages, they quickly become targets for jihadists. Most of the VDP come from the Koglweogo, who in the countryside played the role of both police and judge. They have often been singled out by human rights organizations for acts of torture against people suspected of being bandits. Currently, the VDP are accused of massacres against the Fulani community suspected of supporting the JNIM. The Nigerien armed forces, to a lesser extent, also rely on community militias, notably the Zankaï from the Zarma community, which targets Fulani accused of supporting the Islamic State, particularly in the Tillabéri region.
The AES armies, accompanied by their Russian or community mercenaries, have killed more civilians than jihadists. The latest revelations by the newspaper “Le Monde” and the weekly “Jeune Afrique” about the torture of Wagner mercenaries, all accompanied by racist insults, are a chilling illustration of what the populations of these three countries can endure. Isolation and large-scale human rights violations only strengthen the positions of Islamist or pro-independence armed groups.
The irony is that the strategy of militaristic approach, adopted by the national armed forces, is the same as that followed by the French military, with the same result: a resounding failure, explained by the nature of the crisis in the Sahel.
The Jihadists’ Strategy
In the Sahel, the reasons for engaging in jihadist combat are multiple. They are often linked to the desire to protect oneself, one’s family, or one’s community. It can also be a matter of revenge against the abuses of the authorities or militias claiming to belong to another community. The economic issue, that is, the possibility of gainful employment, is also mentioned by jihadist prisoners or repentant jihadists interviewed by academics. One observation emerges: very few emphasize religion.
Admittedly, there are debates about the importance of religion in this radicalization. It seems unrealistic to completely dismiss this factor. Especially since most leaders have a different, more religious approach, which they convey daily to their fighters. This provides a framework for action but also a justification for the war waged, with its attendant suffering and death.
The strength of jihadist groups lies in their integration into communities in various ways and their involvement in very local conflicts. In other words, political and sometimes armed struggles often predate the emergence of jihadist groups. If we take the case of the Tuareg rebellions, they date back to the beginning of Mali’s independence. Niger has also experienced armed revolts by these communities. In this regard, the career of Iyad Ag Ghali, the leader of the JNIM, is quite edifying and characteristic of the history of the Tuareg struggle in the regions of Mali. In the late 1980s, he founded the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Azawad (MPLA), which had nothing religious about it and defended the demands of the Tuaregs. It wasn’t until the early 2000s that the religious issue became central.
In central Mali, the Macina Katiba of preacher Amadou Koufa was built around defending the poorest populations. He denounced abuses and the obligation to pay for access to pastures, and criticized large herd owners and corrupt clerics. This same rhetoric is found in the Ansarul Islam group in Burkina Faso, which has joined the JNIM. Its leader, Ibrahim Malam Dicko, advocates equality between social classes, defends people of servile origin, and criticizes traditional chiefdoms. These rhetoric resonates strongly among the many young people who are disaffected and without a future.
The jihadists at least guarantee the population justice that appears fair and swift. This dimension is often underestimated but important, even vital, when it comes to resolving land or livestock issues.
This armed struggle is driven by profound social inequalities, the violence of the armed forces, and the lack of justice. It is not overly determined by religious issues, even though the population generally has a strong attachment to Islam. Winning this war requires profound social reforms.
Surprisingly, the French army had taken this dimension into account and attempted to address it by launching the “Sahel Alliance” and then the “Coalition for the Sahel” projects, seeking the participation of the European Union and international financial institutions. This effort was in vain because it contradicted the stated objective of the intervention, namely the eradication of terrorists and not the implementation of a policy of development and improved governance. Such a policy would have clashed with the established elites and ultimately given credence to Islamist fighters criticizing the authorities’ corruption and inefficiency.
The billions spent, and still being spent, are wasted and could have been invested in programs that truly improve the lives of the population.
What future?
Regardless of the specificities of each country comprising the AES, certain common elements can be highlighted as likely to play a role in the future.
First, there has been a desire among the population for years to open a dialogue with jihadists and, more generally, armed groups in order to move towards peace. In the case of Mali, this demand has been reiterated several times. In 2017, during the National Conference of Understanding, civil society called for discussion. In 2019 again, during the inclusive national dialogue, a good number of the 3,000 delegates spoke out in favor of opening talks with Amadou Koufa and Iyad Ag Ghali to establish peace. In Niger, negotiations were initiated by the government in 2022.
Bazoum before he was overthrown. In Burkina Faso, under President Kaboré and then during the first coup d’état led by Lieutenant Colonel Paul-Henri Sandaogo Damiba, the desire for peace negotiations ran up against the intransigence of the French authorities, who had drawn a red line refusing to discuss, and even more so, to negotiate with what they called terrorists. This rule was systematically flouted when it came to negotiating the release of Western hostages.
This search for dialogue is found deep within the three countries. Villages and towns negotiate with jihadists to end the blockade or the attacks, and it is often local leaders and religious figures who lead these discussions. These agreements between villagers and armed groups are seen as support for the jihadists and lead to the massacres of numerous civilians by the military.
The junta in Burkina Faso considers supporters of dialogue to be traitors. [10] Traoré recently declared: “The Burkinabe will not negotiate with their enemy. We will fight and we will win. We will give up nothing, absolutely nothing.” [11]
Secondly, the international situation has repercussions on armed groups, or at least some of them. The evolution of the Hayat Tahrir al-Sham group led by Ahmed al-Sharaa in Syria could be a path taken by JNIM. Namely, disaffiliation from Al-Qaeda, lesser religious demands that would allow alliances with other groups such as the Azawad separatists. Discussions are already underway between these two forces, with two points of divergence: the religious question and the question of independence. If each entity, one dares not say, “waters down its wine,” then an alliance could be formed.
Although skirmishes between the ALF and JNIM occurred at the time of the peace agreement’s termination, a modus vivendi was quickly reached, paving the way for occasional military cooperation against the Malian armed forces and Wagner mercenaries. This was the case in Tin-Zouatin near the Algerian border, where 82 Russians were killed.
A third factor is the growing isolation of the juntas abroad. Niger refuses to cooperate with its neighbour Benin, facilitating the increasing number of jihadist attacks in that country. Burkina Faso has appalling relations with Côte d’Ivoire, accusing it of seeking to destabilize the country without any formal evidence to support this accusation. Mali has fallen out with Algeria, which played a decisive role in the peace agreements since denounced by the junta. These countries bordering those of the AES are increasingly concerned about the deterioration in security, which is weakening their regimes, and are gradually seeing violent incidents occurring on their soil. This is the case, for example, of the W-Arly-Pendjari (WAP) Natural Park, located on the three borders of Benin, Burkina Faso, and Niger, a veritable rear base for armed Islamists.
The fourth point is the fragility of the juntas. Indeed, movements within the army cannot be ruled out. In Burkina Faso, Traoré denounces real or imagined coup attempts that have been thwarted. This shows that he cannot count on the full complement of the armed forces. Recently, Niger experienced two mutinies in the space of two days, one in Filingué and the other in Téra. The troops refused to go to the front, which speaks volumes about the state of the Nigerien forces. In Mali, dissenting voices are being heard within the army.
For the future, many options exist; we can cite three that have occurred in other countries. A Somali-style scenario, in which Islamist groups manage to control most of the territories surrounding capitals, remaining under the domination of juntas, attempting to impose a blockade, and continuing their wars against coastal countries. A second scenario, similar to what happened in Syria, involves the JNIM’s break with Al-Qaeda and a relative deconfessionalization, allowing alliances with factions of the army in one of the three AES countries, based on the expulsion of Russian troops and corruption-free governance. Finally, we cannot rule out the collapse of one of the three regimes under the blows of jihadists, which would have a domino effect on the other two countries. An episode reminiscent of that in Afghanistan, with all its catastrophic consequences, particularly for women.
[1] https://www.rfi.fr/fr/afrique/20250613-mali-embuscade-des-rebelles-du-fla-contre-un-convoi-de-l-arme%C3%A9e-et-de-l-africa-corps-dans-la-r%C3%A9gion-de-kidal
[2] https://www.lemonde.fr/afrique/article/2023/12/21/au-mali-les-operateurs-miniers-sous-la-pression-fiscale-de-bamako-pour-payer-les-mercenaires-de-wagner_6207137_3212.html
[3] https://www.conflictarm.com/
[4] https://www.lemonde.fr/afrique/art
[5] https://tournonslapage.org/fr/actualites/quand-mohamed-bazoum-consolide-la-repression-civique
[6] https://www.ifri.org/fr/presse-contenus-repris-sur-le-site/niger-le-putsch-de-trop
[7] https://afriquexxi.info/La-junte-militaire-a-instaure-la-terreur-partout
[8] https://news.abidjan.net/articles/341644/lancement-officiel-des-activites-de-long-dignite-et-conscience-africaine-les-dirigeants-occidentaux-cloues-au-pilori
[9] https://www.atalayar.com/fr/articulo/politique/lonu-accuse-larmee-malienne-crimes-guerre/20201223162422149027.html
[10] https://www.thenewhumanitarian.org/news-feature/2024/11/18/how-burkina-faso-military-junta-outlawed-local-peace-talks-jihadists
[11] Burkina Faso : première déclaration de Ibrahim Traoré aux troupes depuis les attaques de mai
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